Look at the pictures of Simon, the son of the person who started the thread. One of them has a comment saying, “Simon taking a couple of steps.”
Dr. Diekema attested as a qualified doctor in a case of botched circumcision in the superior court of Washington in January 2006. What he said there is quite interesting when we think of his Ashley case justification. I find his views of “surgical risks” and “pediatrician’s moral and ethical responsibilities to analyze risk vs. benefit independent of parents’ desire” totally relevant to the “Ashley treatment” debate.
For example, he says, “Non-therapeutic procedures that involve excessive risk should be avoided. An appendectomy on a healthy child, who has no history or symptoms of an appendicitis and who is not undergoing an abdominal surgery for other therapeutic reasons, for instance, would not be ethically justifiable because the absence of benefit to the child would not justify the surgical risks.” Continue reading
Peter Singer wrote the article below on the Maraachli case in the NY Daily News.
Commenting on the Maraachli case where Baby Joseph was moved to U. S. after Canadian court ordered removal of his respirator, Rebecca Dresser, a professor of law and medical ethics at Washington University in St. Louis, said in the article below that U.S. courts generally side with families in such cases that want to continue treatment for loved ones even in seemingly hopeless medical cases, that similar end-of-life cases will likely become more common, “Because of the growing concerns about costs, we’re going to see more of this.”
Please note that Dr. Dressor is one of the members of the growth attenuation working group set up by Seattle Children’s and was quoted many times by Christine Ryan Continue reading
Dominic Wilkinson’s article in AJOB February issue.
When is it permissible to allow a newborn infant to die on the basis of their future quality of life? The prevailing official view is that treatment may be withdrawn only if the burdens in an infant’s future life outweigh the benefits. In this paper I outline and defend an alternative view. On the Threshold View, treatment may be withdrawn from infants if their future well-being is below a threshold that is close to, but above the zero-point of well-being. I present four arguments in favor of the Threshold View, and identify and respond to several counterarguments. I conclude that it is justifiable in some circumstances for parents and doctors to decide to allow an infant to die even though the infant’s life would be worth living. The Threshold View provides a justification for treatment decisions that is more consistent, more robust, and potentially more practical than the standard view.
Wilkinson coauthored the following papers with Julian Savulescu. Continue reading